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FEDERAL TAXATION: SHORT TERM TRUST INCOME
USED TO DISCHARGE IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS HELD TAXABLE TO THE GRANTOR
THE USE OF a short term' or "Clifford" trust2 as a device for mini-
mizing income taxes has been consistently limited by the legal obli-
'See INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78. As a general rule, the grantor of a trust
is not taxed on the income earned by the trust corpus unless he is considered the
"substantial owner." In § 673 (a), however, it is provided that a reversionary interest
in either the corpus or income is not "substantial ownership" for tax purposes if
the reversion will not take effect in possession or enjoyment within ten years of the
transfer of the corpus to the trust; furthermore, under § 677 (a), income during the
ten year period may not be accumulated for distribution to the grantor. Transfers
under § 673, therefore, are called "short term" trusts and constitute a popular device
in family tax arrangements.
Many limitations and exceptions are imposed upon the basic structure provided
in § 673(a). Exceptions to the ten year rule are stated in §§ 673(b)-(c). Neither the
grantor nor a nonadverse party may retain the power to control the beneficial
enjoyment of the trust corpus or income under § 674 (a); exceptions to this qualifica-
tion are enumerated in §§ 674(b)-(d). Restrictions on retained administrative powers
and the power to revoke the trust are set forth in §§ 675-76.
For purposes of this casenote, however, the important restriction is contained in
§ 677. If the income of the trust may, without the consent of an adverse party, be
distributed to the grantor, held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor,
or be applied to certain life insurance premiums on the life of the grantor, then
such income which may be so applied or distributed is taxable to the grantor. The
courts and the Treasury Department have said that income applied to the discharge
of a legal obligation of the grantor is deemed to have been distributed to the grantor
for purposes of § 677(a). See, e.g., Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935). However,
where the trustee or person other than the grantor has a discretionary power to
apply income in the satisfaction of the grantor's legal obligation of support, it is
taxable to the grantor under § 677 (b) only to the extent it has in fact been so applied.
See generally Alexander, The Short Term Trust, 31 Miss. LJ. 263 (1960); Colgan,
The Short Term Trust, Trust Bull., Sept. 1956, p. 3; Durkin, Short Term Reversion-
ary Trusts, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 80 (1959); Foosaner, Short Term Trusts Can Now le Used
to Lower Tax Liability, 4 J. TAxATON 222 (1956); Grotheer, Short Term Trusts and
Their Pitfalls, Trust Bull., Feb. 1959, p. 27; MacNeil, Short Term Trusts-Their Uses
and Abuses, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 16 (1962); Schuyler, Short Term Trusts-A Positive
Approach to a Law Full of Negatives, Trust Bull., Feb. 1957, p. 20; Yohlin, The Short
Term Trust-A Respectable Tax Savings Device, 14 TAx L. Rzv. 109 (1958).
2 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). This was the first case in which the
Supreme Court held that short term trust income would be taxed to the grantor
if he retained substantial ownership in the trust. In an attempt to refine the Clifford
case by establishing specific elements of control, the Treasury promulgated the
"Clifford Regulations." Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-21 (1944); Treas. Reg. 111, §
29.22 (a)-21 (1944), added by T.D. 5488, 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 19, as amended, T.D. 5567,
1947-2 Cuss. BULL. 9. These regulations constitute the basis for the present code
sections dealing with short term trusts. See note 1 supra.
See generally Alexandre, A Case Method Restatement of the New Clifford Regula-
tions, 3 TAx L. RXv. 189 (1947); Atlas, The Clifford Regulations: Genesis of a Concept,
25 TExAs L. Rxv. 373 (1947); Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly
City of Legislative Intention, 2 TAx L. Rxv. 327 (1947); Guterman, The New Clifford
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gation doctrine.3 Under this concept short term trust income has
been held taxable to the grantor when applied to discharge either
his express contractual obligations or duties imposed by law.4 In
Morrill v. United States,5 the scope of the legal obligation doctrine
was extended for the first time to include the use of short term
trust income to discharge implied contractual obligations.
In Morrill the grantor established short term trusts for each of
his four children, giving the trustees discretionary power to pay
college and private school fees from trust income. 6 Five schools
subsequently attended by the children sent their bills to the grantor,
who in turn passed them on to the trustees for payment. 7 The
grantor conceded that by signing agreements with two of the schools
he had expressly obligated himself to pay all expenses incurred by
his children." But he argued that in the absence of an express con-
tractual obligation or legal duty of support, he could not be taxed
on trust income paid to the other three schools. The court, how-
ever, found that the grantor had impliedly obligated himself by his
conduct to pay the room and tuition charges. 9 It held that these
implied contracts were legal obligations, and that trust income used
to discharge contractual obligations, either express or implied, was
therefore taxable as income to the grantor.10
The short term trust permits a high income taxpayer to transfer
income-producing property to a trust for a minimum period of
Regulations, 1 TAX L. REv. 379 (1946); Magill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford
Case, 45 COLUm. L. REv. 111 (1945); Pavenstedt, The Treasury Legislates: The Dis-
tortion of the Clifford Rule, 2 TAx L. REv. 7 (1946); Seidman, The Income Tax Regu-
lations of Trusts, 24 TAXES 549 (1946); Smith, How New Regulations Affect the Clifford
Case, 24 TAXES 624 (1946).
'Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a)-i (d) (1956). See generally 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOam
TAXATION § 37.47 (1957) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
'Id. § 37.09.
228 F. Supp. 734 (D. Me. 1964).
The trust agreement provided for the accumulation of income to be paid the
children at age twenty-one provided, however, that income could be applied at the
discretion of the trustee to pay college and private school expenses. Brief for Defen-
dant, p. 4.
7 Morrill would send the bills to the trustees with his personal check for expenses,
exclusive of room and tuition, and a request that trust income be used to pay the
room and tution charges. The trustee would draw a check on the trust income and
send it with Morrill's check to the schools. 228 F. Supp. at 735.
8 Id. at 736; see id. at 735 n.l.
OId. at 737; see 3 COrN, CONTRACTS § 566 (1960); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 72
(1932).
0 228 F. Supp. at 737.
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time." The advantages of this device are the temporary removal
of income from the grantor's high tax bracket, application of the
income to the benefit of a person in a lower bracket, and the return
of the corpus to the grantor after a ten year period. The trust in-
come, however, may be taxed to the grantor if he has retained con-
trol of or received benefit from the trust, thereby rendering the grant-
or a "substantial owner."'12 Thus, under section 677 (a) of the 1954
Code,'3 the grantor is treated as the owner of any portion of a trust
whose income may be "distributed to the grantor"'14 without the
consent of an adverse party.'5 The courts and the Treasury Regula-
tions'16 have maintained that the application of trust income to dis-
charge a grantor's "legal obligation" is to be treated as such a distri-
bution of income.'7 This is consistent with the concept of "income"
evolved under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code.' 8 The
"See note 1 supra.
12 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). See notes 1-2 supra.
2
8
"The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust ... whose
income without the approval or consent of any adverse party is, or, in the discretion
of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, may be-
(1) distributed to the grantor; . . ." INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 677 (a).
11 Regardless of whether trust income is distributed to the grantor pursuant to a
mandatory provision or pursuant to the discretion of a nonadverse party, it is no
longer of any consequence to the tax liability of the grantor under § 677 (a) if the
trust income is actually used to discharge his legal obligation. Furthermore, in a
discretionary trust the possibility that short term trust income may be distributed
to the grantor will also result in tax liability under § 677 (a). The section is concerned
not only with the actual distribution, but with what might be done with the trust
income. Rollins v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 390 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763 (1937).
See Helvering v. Evans, 126 F.2d 270 (3d Cir, 1942); Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116
F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 706 (1941). An exception to this latter
rule is found in § 677 (b) of the code to the extent that if the trust provides for a
discretionary distribution of income to discharge the grantor's legal obligation of sup-
port, only that amount of trust income actually applied will be taxable to him. See
note 17 infra.
2rAn adverse party is "any person having a substantial beneficial interest in the
trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power
which he possesses respecting the trust." INT. R-v. CODE OF 1954, § 672.
16 See note 3 supra.
17Since the 1939 Code contained no special provision for the taxation of short
term trusts, the Supreme Court used various sections to determine the tax liability
of the grantor. The Court relied on § 22 (a) (predecessor of § 61 (a) of the 1954 code),
defining gross income, to tax the grantor when income was required by the trust
agreement to be. used in the satisfaction of the legal obligations of the grantor.
Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935). However, the Court applied § 167 of the 1939
Code (similar in language to § 677 (a) of the 1954 Code) to tax short term trust
income to the grantor when he or a nonadverse party retained the discretionary
power to apply that income to discharge the grantor's legal obligations. Helvering v.
Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942).
"'See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (payment
of employee's income taxes constitutes income to the employee); Canton v. United
[Vol. 1965: 174
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satisfaction of a legal obligation by a third party relieves the tax-
payer of a primary liability for payment, and hence constitutes
measurable economic benefit.19
Until the decision in the instant case, courts have applied the
legal obligation doctrine only to situations in which trust income
was used to satisfy an obligation imposed upon the grantor by law
or express contract.20 Thus, the grantor has been taxed where short
term trust income was used 2' to discharge a debt of the grantor,22
to pay gift taxes on the trust transfer,m to pay income or property
taxes, 24 to discharge encumbrances on real estate,2 to meet alimony
payments2 6 or to discharge the grantor's duty of support.27
In determining whether a duty of support was a legal obligation
the courts have looked to the law of the local jurisdiction, 28 resulting
in a lack of uniformity among the decisions.m The question
of whether a college education is a necessary element of support re-
flects this conflict.30 The majority of cases have held that a college
States, 226 F.2d 313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S." 965 (1955) (cancellation of loan
made to taxpayer by his brother resulted in taxable income).
"0 See Treas. Reg. § 1.662 (a)-4 (1956), which provides that trust income used to
support a beneficiary whom a third person has a primary legal obligation to support
is taxable to such third person.
-1 See 6 MaRTENS § 37.09, at 36 n.10 (1957).
21 See note 14 supra.
1Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U.S. 552, reversing 76 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1935);
James L Knight, 39 B.T.A. 436 (1939); Rev. Rul. 54-516, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 54.
28 Sheaffer's Estate v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 738 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
818 (1963); Staley v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
786 (1943); Rev. Rul. 57-564, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 326.
2
'John Koehrer, 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 235 (1945); cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
25 See Rev. Rul. 54-516, 1954-2 Cumr. BuLL. 54 (grantor remained liable on mortgage
on real estate transferred to trust); cf. Rev. Rul. 55-286, 1955-1 CUM. BuLL. 75.
20 Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U.S. 149 (1940).
1 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U.S. 551
(1935), reversing 75 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1935); Estate of Hamiel v. Commissioner, 253
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1958); Mairs v. Reynolds, 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941). See also
note 14 supra.
28 See Mairs v. Reynolds, 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Tuttle,
89 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1937). Compare Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 910, 914 (1948) (no parental
responsibility to children of majority age).
" Compare Parker v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1948), with Commis-
sioner v. Tuttle, 89 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1937). The test for legally required support
has for the most part been a 'practical one-was income applied to the extent the
grantor would have provided notvithstanding the existence of the trust and its
income. See Hill v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1937); Alfred C. Berolzheimer,
40 B.T.A. 645, rev/d on other grounds, 116 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1940).
83 Compare Titus v. Titus, 311 Mich. 434, 18 N.W.2d 883 (1945), with Hachat v.
Hachat, 117 Ind. App. 294, 71 N.E.2d 927 (1947).
Vol. 1965: 174]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
education is within the duty of support 3 1 and the standard usually
applied has been whether the parents are finanbially able and the
child capable of college level work.
The court in Morrill, however, did not reach the issue of whether
the grantor-parent was obligated under Maine law to provide for
the college education of his children. 32 Instead, it found an implied
contractual obligation to be within the scope of the legal obligation
doctrine.33 It is possible that the court in Morrill selected the im-
plied contract theory to avoid the uncertainty in Maine law regard-
ing college education as an element of support.3 4
Nevertheless, the Morrill decision may be criticized on the theory
that an additional ground for asserting tax liability should not have
been invoked unless existing bases for imposing liability have been
exhausted.3 5 However, the implied contractual obligation theory of
81 Hale v. Hale, 55 Cal. App. 2d 879, 132 P.2d 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Maitzen
v. Maitzen, 24 111. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Hart v. Hart, 259 Iowa 142,
80 N.W.2d 748 (1948); Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 363 P.2d 795 (1961); Johnson
v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956); Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So.
2d 769 (1959); Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936); Lund v. Lund,
96 N.H. 283, 74 A.2d 557 (1950); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J. Super. 26, 69 A.2d 752
(Super. CL, App. Div. 1949) (dictum); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 170 Ohio St. 507, 166
N.E.2d 396 (1960); Stoner v. Weiss, 96 Okla. 285, 222 Pac. 547 (1924); Jackman v.
Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941); Atchley v. Atchley 29 Tenn. App. 124, 194
S.W.2d 252 (1945); Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 122, 210 P.2d 1022 (1949) (dictum);
Peck v. Peck, 271 Wis. 466, 76 N.W.2d 316 (1956); cf. Rufner v. Rufner, 131 N.J. Eq.
193, 24 A.2d 180 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942). Contra, Worthington v. Worthington, 207
Ark. 185, 179 S.W.2d 648 (1944); Hachat v. Hachat, 117 Ind. App. 294, 71 N.E.2d
927 (1947); Clark v. Graves, 282 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1955) (college education not part
of required support but ordered father to continue payments while child attended
college on *scholarship); Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844). Compare
Herbert v. Herbert, 198 Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950), with Samson
v. Schoen, 204 Misc. 603, 121 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1953).
:2 The point was, however, argued by both parties in their briefs.
3 228 F. Supp. at 737.
31It would appear from a decision of the Maine supreme court that certain
requirements must be met before the court would consider college or higher educa-
tion to be within the statutory requirements of support. In a leading case the court
held that an order providing additional payment by the father to the mother for
the minor child's musical training was within the purpose and intention of the
Maine support statute. The court considered that such additional payments were
warranted by the child's natural talent, the necessity of providing a vocation, con-
formance with her station in life, the father's financial ability, and the standard
of living established by the father before the divorce. Luques v. Luques, 127 Me.
356, 143 At. 263 (1928).
Using the Luques decision as a basis, a Maine.court would probably look with
favor upon the theory that a parent, if financially able and the child capable, would
be obligated under the law of Maine to provide a college education for that child.
See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
asIn a similar factual situation, another court has intimated the existence of
implied contractual obligations with colleges, but disregarded them by basing its
[Vol. 1965: 174
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liability is not a novel interpretation of the law, but merely a logical
extension of the legal obligation doctrine. Although the term legal
obligation has not been defined, it is reasonable to assume that it
contemplates all obligations of the grantor which would be enforce-
able in a court of law, whether they be the product of a legally
imposed duty, or a contract, express or implied.36 To allow a grantor
to escape tax liability merely because he has bound himself by his
conduct instead of words would be contrary to the meaning and
purpose of the legal obligation doctrine.37
The Morrill decision has special significance in cases where the
grantor is bound neither by an express contract nor by a duty im-
posed by law. As a general rule of contract law, -an express contract
is created by oral or written manifestations of assent, whereas an
implied contract is the result of mutual promises implied from the
conduct of the parties.3 This necessitates a careful analysis of the
surrounding circumstances in each case, including the history of
prior dealings and the expectations of the parties. However, various
problems of interpretation may result from imposing tax liability
through state laws of implied contract.3 9 Suppose, for example, that
a grantor establishes a short term trust for the benefit of his elderly
parents to whom no duty of support is owed.40 If the parent's doctor
sends his bill for medical services to the son instead of the invalid
parent, payment of the bill with trust income might be held tax-
able to the grantor-son unless he had advised the doctor that future
bills should be directed to the trustee. If, however, the grantor-son
is in fact the trustee as well, is the bill sent to him in his capacity
as a trustee or as grantor? Suppose further that the trust was created
after the grantor has already made several payments. Can the obli-
gation as to future bills be shifted by advising the doctor of the
existence of the trust?
decision upon the duty of a parent under Minnesota law to provide for the college
education of his children. Maits v. Reynolds, 120 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1941).
"But see note 43 infra.
'1 See Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S.
1 (1935); Estate of Hamiel v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1958); Hopkins
v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1944).
381 CORBIN, CONTRACrs § 18 (1963); SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 5 (1954); 1 WmLusroN,
CONTRACTS § 3 (3d ed. 1957).
19 Regardless of which theory is used to invoke the legal obligation doctrine, the
decision will be predicated upon state law. See, e.g., Mais v. Reynolds, 120 F.2d 857
(8th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Tuttle, 89 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1937).
10 For other typical uses of short term trusts see Woodward, The Short Term Trust:
A Useful Device for Tax Savings in Many Situations, 8 J. TAXATION 242 (1958).
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Another problem is presented in the case of a grantor-father who
accompanies his adult son to purchase a sailboat and tacitly indi-
cates his approval of the youth's selection. Has the grantor impliedly
obligated himself to pay the installments by not advising the sales-
man of the existence of the trust? Or suppose the grantor-father's
minor daughter attended a finishing school and he has paid previous
bills to fulfill his legal obligation to educate a minor. Does the pre-
vious course of conduct impliedly obligate him to continue paying
the fees once the daughter has reached her majority?
The grantor could avoid the risk of taxation in the aforemen-
tioned hypotheticals by requesting the third party to look to the
trust for payment of future debts. 41 As a practical matter, though,
the. third party may not be willing to accept this arrangement, par-
ticularly if the distribution of trust income is left to the discretion
of the trustee. In this event, the third party might accede to the
request if the grantor agreed to act as a guarantor. Although pay-
ment by use of trust funds would discharge the grantor's secondary
liability, such payment should not constitute "income" to the
grantor-guarantor. 42 His obligation to pay does not mature into a
primary legal liability until the principal debtor has defaulted.
Nevertheless, the grantor would be well advised to assume only the
posture of a grantor rather than a surety.43
Application of the legal obligation doctrine may be precluded
by careful drafting of the trust agreement. If the beneficiary is
1 The court in Morrill relied heavily on the fact that the grantor had consented to
the colleges' policy of sending bills to him and not to the trust. See 228 F. Supp. at 757.
,2 The issue has never been decided by the courts. The failure to prosecute such
cases may indicate the acquiescence of the Internal Revenue Service.
13A guarantor promises to account for the payment of a debt in the event the
initial debtor fails to meet his obligation. Thus, satisfaction of a debt by use of
trust income would not fulfill a legal obligation of the grantor-guarantor, for he
,would not become liable until the initial debtor (the trust) defaults.
The surety, on the other hand, is primarily liable from the onset, giving the
creditor an option of collecting from either the surety or the initial debtor. From
a conceptual point of view, therefore, it might be argued that satisfaction of a
legal obligation of the trust by use of trust income also discharges a primary legal
obligation of the grantor-surety. However, no case has ever held the satisfaction of a
legal obligation by the principal debtor to be taxable to the surety under the legal
obligation doctrine, presumably because the surety is entitled to reimbursement from
the initial debtor. That is, as long as the debtor-trust remains financially capable of
payment, the surety will not bear the ultimate cost and responsibility of satisfying
the debt.
The same rule of reimbursement applies to a guarantor, and it may be argued
that default by the debtor-trust should not render subsequent payment by the trust
taxable income to the grantor-guarantor despite the fact his liability has matured
into a primary obligation. See SIMPSON, SURErsmP §§ 1-14 (1950).
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given an unrestricted use of trust income, one thousand dollars a
year may be distributed free of any tax.44 The use of this income
by the beneficiary to pay college fees, or installments on a sailboat
is not taxable to the grantor under section 677 (a).45 Although this
avoids the problem inherent in short term trusts, the grantor might
be taxed under the concept of "income" expressed in section 61 (a).46
As a final consideration, the impact of the Morrill decision may
be diminished by the difficulty the Internal Revenue Service will
encounter in detecting the existence of implied contracts. Aside
from the bare recording of payment in the trustee's records, the
Service might not be able to discover any other clue indicating the
formation of an implied contractual obligation.
The Morrill case, therefore, adds another obstacle which the
grantor of a short term trust must overcome in providing for the
distribution of trust income. Although the decision is admittedly
consistent with the theory of discharging a legal obligation, the de-
sirability of creating another pitfall may be questioned in light of
the problems inherent in interpreting state laws regarding implied
contracts, the ease of avoidance by careful and well advised grantors,
and the difficulty of discovering implied contractual obligations.
"4 By establishing a short term trust which would result in $1,000 a year in income
of which at least $100 is derived from stock dividends, no taxes would need be paid
under the 1964 amendments to the Code. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 116 (a), as amended
by Revenue Act of 1964, § 201, 78 Stat. 19 (1964). With a trust income of $1,000
less the increased stock dividend deduction of $100, less the minimum standard deduc-
tion of $300, less the individual's personal exemption of $600, there would be no
taxable income. See 4 P-H 1964 FED. TAXEs 32340.
'"Section 677(a) does not reach the income payable to a beneficiary without
restriction as to its use, though the beneficiary may thereafter apply it voluntarily
to the benefit of the grantor. Lura H. Morgan, 2 T.C. 510 (.943), acq., 1944 CuM.
BuLL. 20. The beneficiary's use of trust income to the benefit of the grantor would
not be taxable to the grantor under § 677 (a), because under § 672 a beneficiary is
considered an adverse party as to that income in which he has a substantial beneficial
interest. Treas. Reg. § 1.672 (a)-1 (1956). See note 14 supra.
40 INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a). See cases cited note 18 supra, dealing with
§ 61 (a) treatment of satisfaction by third parties of obligations imposed upon the
taxpayer by law or express contract.
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